Georgia Response Plan
For
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
In Poultry
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The overarching goal of the *Georgia Response Plan for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Poultry* (Plan) is to detect, control, and eradicate an outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza virus (HPAI) in all types of Georgia poultry. For the purposes of the Plan, poultry refers to chickens, ducks, geese, swans, turkeys, pigeons, doves, pheasants, grouse, partridges, quail, guinea fowl, and pheasant. Response to HPAI should be expedient in order to return individual farms to normal production and the State to a disease-free status. The Plan is a guide and the framework is consistent with federal guidance from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (e.g. National Incident Management System, National Response Plan) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services (USDA APHIS VS). The Plan is also consistent with the State of Georgia Emergency Operations Plan (i.e. Emergency Support Function 11 Agriculture and Natural Resources, and others). Actions may be modified as deemed appropriate to meet the overarching goal. The actual field circumstances surrounding a presumptive or confirmed HPAI case may require modification of response actions specified in this Plan.

The Plan references statutory authorities and provides detailed procedures for avian influenza (AI) surveillance and emergency response to a laboratory confirmation of a HPAI virus in Georgia poultry. The emergency response components include quarantine and movement controls, humane euthanasia, disposal, cleaning and disinfection, biosecurity, appraisal, and compensation. The Plan also includes processes for disseminating information, addressing aspects of public health, crisis management, and other activities.

Aggressive surveillance programs are in place to monitor for AI viruses in the State. All susceptible birds with unexplained illness submitted to diagnostic laboratories in Georgia are screened for AI. All U.S. poultry companies producing breeding stock are participants in the National Poultry Improvement Program and the majority of poultry companies participate in the National Chicken Council AI Monitored Program. In addition, birds sold in Georgia’s licensed poultry sales establishments and relevant migratory waterfowl are also monitored.

Georgia law requires that a clinical suspicion, local laboratory result, or other reasonable suspicion of HPAI in any bird shall be reported immediately to the Georgia State Veterinarian or the USDA Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC). The Office of the State Veterinarian or the USDA AVIC will assure that the owner and manager of poultry have been notified and requested that the premises be voluntarily and immediately isolated. Additional notifications will include, but not be limited to, the Georgia Agriculture Commissioner, the Poultry Emergency Disease Committee (PEDC), and other appropriate response agencies (e.g. OHS/GEMA, GA Division of Public Health, Athens and Tifton Diagnostic Laboratories, etc.), as necessary. Strict biosecurity will be required on the affected premises and a state-issued quarantine of the premises may be issued at the discretion of the State Veterinarian or the AVIC. Samples from suspicious flocks will be immediately submitted to the USDA National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) in Ames, Iowa, for confirmation. The NVSL shall report confirmatory results to the State Veterinarian and the AVIC. The State Veterinarian and AVIC will take necessary action to contain the situation prior to receiving a confirmed positive result.
The Georgia Commissioner of Agriculture will initiate a response cascade in the event of a positive confirmation of HPAI from the NVSL. The Office of the State Veterinarian will immediately quarantine the premises, if not already under official quarantine. The State Veterinarian and the AVIC will activate the Unified Area Command (UAC) and serve as joint commanders. The UAC will set the overall objectives for controlling and eradicating the outbreak and delegate authority to the Georgia State Agriculture Response Team(s) (GA-SARTs). The State Veterinarian will formally activate the PEDC to advise and consult with the UAC. When appropriate, the Commissioner of Agriculture will request that the Governor declare an agriculture emergency to avail the resources of the Office of Homeland Security/Georgia Emergency Management Agency and other state assets. Also when appropriate, USDA APHIS VS will initiate a request to the Secretary of USDA to declare an extraordinary emergency to avail USDA resources. In the event of agroterrorism, the UAC will fully cooperate with the FBI in their criminal investigation.

The GA-SART will plan and direct the response to the incident in the field. The GA-SART will be multidisciplinary with representatives from state and federal agencies, academic institutions, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. A control area will be established around the affected areas with various levels of movement restrictions within zones for poultry, poultry products, vehicles, related equipment, and personnel. All farms with poultry located within the control area and those with epidemiological links will be monitored for HPAI. Poultry on infected premises will be humanely euthanized with proper disposal. USDA will provide compensation for poultry that are destroyed. Strict biosecurity will be required in the control area. Law enforcement personnel may be utilized to enforce state-ordered quarantines and maintain perimeter security.

During an outbreak of HPAI, it is imperative that accurate information be disseminated on a timely basis to keep the public well informed. Media alerts will be coordinated and disseminated through a joint information center. Information may include updates of test results, status of the outbreak and control measures, and public health information.

Georgia also has a program to contain low pathogenic H5 and H7 avian influenza (LPAI) viruses, which typically do not cause significant sickness or death in poultry. In addition, LPAI has not been known to be a serious threat to human health. The Georgia Program for LPAI served as the basic platform for development of this Plan.

The Georgia Committee on Agriculture and Food Defense, under the auspices of the State Homeland Security Task Force, has taken aggressive actions to increase awareness about foreign animal diseases, including preparedness for HPAI and the public’s responsibility to report HPAI to proper officials.

II. STATUTORY AUTHORITIES

Avian influenza, including Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), is reportable to the Georgia Department of Agriculture (GDA) State Veterinarian or the USDA Area Veterinarian In
Charge (AVIC) in accordance with Georgia Code O.C.G.A. 4-4-6 designating reportable diseases. Authority for eradication of contagious and infectious diseases is contained in Georgia Animal Health Code O.C.G.A. 4-4-70 designating the Commissioner of Agriculture with this authority.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza is a reportable disease as designated in 9 CFR part 53.1 designating reportable diseases. USDA is designated with authority for containment, destruction and indemnity in accordance with CFR 9 part 53 inclusive. The U.S. Secretary of Agriculture has broad powers of authority to respond to an animal disease/pest threat and may declare an agricultural emergency or an extra-ordinary emergency in accordance with US Code Title 7, Chapter 109, Section 8306 (Animal Health Protection Act), which allows the emergency use of funds from the Commodity Credit Corporation. Additionally, USDA may request federal to federal assistance thru new or existing MOU’s or participate in a declared Incident of National Significance utilizing the Economy Act. In accordance with CFR 9 part 53.2, the USDA APHIS Administrator also has the authority to invite the proper state authorities to cooperate with USDA in the control and eradication of HPAI. Upon agreement of the authorities of the state to enforce quarantine restrictions/orders/directives properly issued in the control and eradication of HPAI, the Administrator is authorized to cooperate with the state in the control and eradication of HPAI, and to pay 100 percent of the expenses of purchase, destruction and disposition of animals and materials required to be destroyed because of being contaminated by or exposed to the disease. A memorandum of understanding between USDA and GDA will outline the cooperative response to a HPAI outbreak.

A HPAI incident with zoonotic potential may become an Incident of National Significance which may require activation of the National Incident Management System coordinated by the Department of Homeland Security. The Georgia Emergency Management Act, O.C.G.A. 38, allows the Governor to release state assets in support of the multi-agency, multi-disciplinary response and to approve emergency contracts, access military support for civil authority, and access other necessary resources.

As the lead agency for ESF 8 and a supporting agency under ESF 11, the Georgia Department of Human Resources coordinates and/or assists in the delivery of medical, environmental health and mental health services. The Georgia Division of Public Health (GDPH) conducts surveillance for reportable human illnesses, participates in animal control activities and wild bird surveillance (rabies and WNV respectively), accesses and/or seeks health-related private resources; supplements health service delivery personnel and resources; and coordinates rehabilitation support. All emergencies begin as local events. Public Health districts are responsible for providing and coordinating public health services necessary to prevent or control diseases resulting from emergencies and to assure the best quality of life possible until the emergency is over and normal operations have resumed. These responsibilities are linked to the essential Public Health functions. The GDPH is responsible for facilitating and coordinating the response.

mammal and bird species that are reservoirs for zoonotic diseases, or animal species that are injurious and/or a nuisance to, among other things, agriculture, horticulture, forestry, animal husbandry, wildlife, and human health and safety.

Georgia DNR has authority under the following code sections to perform the necessary duties outlined in this plan: O.C.G.A. 27-1-3: Ownership and custody of wildlife: Wildlife is held in trust by the State and is within the custody of the department. O.C.G.A. 27-1-22: Taking, possessing, and releasing of wildlife generally: Personnel of the department may take, transport, possess, etc., wildlife at such times and by such means and in such quantities as are otherwise made unlawful by this title. O.C.G.A. 27-5-2: Powers of the board generally: Board has authority to regulate the importation, transportation, sale, and possession, of wild animals… O.C.G.A. 27-5-3: Powers of the department generally: (d) the department may quarantine or otherwise dispose of or order the disposition of any wild animal when it determines that the wild animal is affected with or exposed to a contagious or infectious disease.

III. OVERVIEW AND GENERAL INFORMATION

A. Overview

The overarching goal of this emergency response plan is to detect, contain and eradicate an outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) virus in Georgia poultry. This Plan is designed to be a guide. Actions may be modified by the Unified Area Command and the GA-State Agriculture Response Team (GA-SART) as deemed appropriate to meet the objectives.

In general, the Plan calls for the following actions:

- A clinical diagnosis, a suspect result at the screening laboratory, or other reasonable suspicion of HPAI in any bird is to be reported immediately to the Georgia State Veterinarian or USDA Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC). Early detection is the key to containment and eradication. It is important that potential signs of AI are recognized and reported to a local veterinarian, county extension agent, poultry diagnostic laboratory, or directly to state or federal animal health officials.

- The State Veterinarian’s Office or the USDA AVIC’s Office will assure that the company/owner and grower/manager of the affected poultry are contacted and requested to voluntarily and immediately isolate the premises. A state-issued quarantine may be placed on the premises by the Georgia Department of Agriculture at the discretion of the State Veterinarian or the USDA AVIC. The owner and manager shall immediately stop all servicing and non-essential visits until the situation is further defined. Designated diagnosticians, GDA or USDA approved personnel, limited company personnel and other limited and authorized personnel shall be the only visitors allowed on the farm, using appropriate biosecurity measures.

- The National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) shall report confirmed case(s) of HPAI to the State Veterinarian and the USDA AVIC. NVSL shall prepare a report when any presumptive H5 sample from any source arrives at NVSL’s receiving area, or any H5
(and H7) specific rRT-PCR results or confirmatory results are obtained. The report(s) will be sent to the APHIS Administrator, the Associate Deputy Administrator for Emergency Management & Diagnostics, the Associate Deputy Administrator for Regional and Field Operations, etc. The Regional Directors will be notified through official channels and will in turn contact the appropriate AVIC. The AVIC will then contact the State Veterinarian and the State Laboratory. (as per June 2, 2006 letter from John Clifford, Deputy Administrator, Veterinary Services, “Reporting and Submission Requirements for All Presumptive Positive Avian Influenza (AI) H5 samples”; see attached). Accordingly, the Commissioner of Agriculture may issue emergency rules outlining movement restrictions of live poultry within the State until the extent of the outbreak is known. The State Veterinarian shall activate this Plan, including a meeting or conference call with the Poultry Emergency Disease Committee (PEDC).

- A Cooperative Agreement will immediately be established between USDA and the Georgia Department of Agriculture, in accordance with 9 CFR Part 53.2, to control and eradicate HPAI, including but not limited to the enforcement of quarantine restrictions, orders, and directives.

- The Georgia Division of Public Health will provide support to the UAC and GA-SART(s) to protect worker safety and to conduct human health surveillance for adverse events.

The Unified Area Command (UAC) will set the objectives for immediately controlling and eradicating HPAI, in consultation with the PEDC. A Multi-Agency Coordination Group (MAC) may be established to provide additional resources and support, as needed. The GA-SART(s) will manage the incident. The initial control/quarantine areas and zones will be established by the Incident Command with recommendations from the UAC and the PEDC.

- All information will be disseminated by the Public Information Officers assigned to the UAC and GA-SART, in cooperation with the Joint Information Center of the Georgia Office of Homeland Security/Georgia Emergency Management Agency (OHS/GEMA) if one has been established. Information may include daily updates of test results, new cases and measures taken.
Table: Sequence of Events and Consequences during AI Outbreak

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sequence of Events</th>
<th>Consequence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suspicious clinical signs and/or suspect results at the screening laboratory</td>
<td>Laboratory tests are repeated and additional samples are collected from the flock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional samples (serum and swabs) to Screening Laboratory (within 24 hrs.)</td>
<td>Laboratory tests conducted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary isolation of flock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Possible quarantine of premises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screening Laboratory results:</td>
<td>Flock is free to move</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative for H5/H7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screening Laboratory results:</td>
<td>Activate LPAI Plan with high mortality and lesions of HPAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positive for H5/H7 - “Presumptive Positive”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of samples to NVSL (within 24 hours)</td>
<td>Confirmatory tests are conducted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVSL Serological results:</td>
<td>Flock is free to move</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative for H5/H7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVSL Serological results:</td>
<td>Presumptive Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positive for H5/H7 (within 24 hours)</td>
<td>Quarantine of premises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathogenicity testing at NVSL:</td>
<td>Laboratory tests conducted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molecular sequencing (2-3 days)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bird inoculation (5-7 days)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathogenicity results:</td>
<td>Continue with LPAI Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative for HPAI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathogenicity results:</td>
<td>Activate HPAI Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positive for HPAI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Avian Influenza Flow Chart

- Clinical Signs Resembling AI
- Presumptive Positive result at Screening Laboratory

Flock is sampled
Laboratory tests are repeated IMMEDIATELY

Voluntary Premises Isolation
(Possible State-issued quarantine)

NEGATIVE

Results of second set of samples at screening laboratory

PRESUMPTIVE POSITIVE
(Possible State-issued quarantine)

AI RULED OUT
No movement restrictions

NEGATIVE

Samples sent to NVSL for confirmation

CONFIRMED HPAI POSITIVE
(State-issued quarantine)

ACTIVATE HPAI RESPONSE PLAN

CONFIRMED LPAI POSITIVE

CONTINUE LPAI RESPONSE
B. General Information Dissemination

The Georgia Poultry Laboratory Network (GPLN) maintains a distribution list of all commercial poultry companies and keeps them regularly informed about AI. The GDA and the USDA also update poultry owners and managers from time-to-time about animal disease issues. For non-commercial producers, hobbyists and private individuals, information regarding disease awareness, diagnostic assistance and biosecurity is distributed through a variety of additional venues, including poultry auctions and sales.

In partnership with the University of Georgia Cooperative Extension Service and, in the future, the Georgia Public Safety Training Center, seminars in Agrosecurity Awareness: Protecting Agriculture and Food are provided throughout the State of Georgia to inform veterinarians, extension personnel, first responders, law enforcement personnel, farmers and others. The curriculum includes information about foreign animal diseases, the Georgia Reportable Animal Disease System, and the importance of recognizing and reporting these diseases to animal health officials. Specific exercises focus on poultry diseases and the threat of AI.

The GDA and USDA will continue to periodically offer educational programs to licensed veterinarians on foreign animal diseases, including HPAI and other Reportable Animal Diseases, the Incident Command System, ESF 11, and the Georgia Emergency Response Plan. Additionally, Reportable Animal Diseases System educational materials (e.g. posters, wallet cards) are distributed to a wide audience at agrosecurity trainings, veterinary continuing educational seminars, producer meetings, and through mass mailings.

IV. EXISTING AVIAN INFLUENZA (AI) SURVEILLANCE

A. Passive Surveillance for AI in Georgia

1. Georgia Poultry Laboratory Network (GPLN). The majority of passive surveillance is conducted by the GPLN. All birds submitted to the GPLN with unexplained illness and all birds with respiratory disease, diarrhea, or egg production drops are screened for AI virus using a quick antigen detection test and/or a Real Time Reverse Transcriptase Polymerase Chain Reaction (RRT-PCR) test.

2. Poultry Diagnostic & Research Center (PDRC), University of Georgia. All birds submitted to the PDRC with unexplained illness and all birds with respiratory disease, diarrhea, or egg production drops are screened for AI virus using a quick antigen detection test and/or a RRT-PCR test.

3. Athens Veterinary Diagnostic and Tifton Veterinary Diagnostic and Investigational Laboratories also conduct passive surveillance testing for AI on cases submitted to these laboratories.

4. Southeastern Cooperative Wildlife Disease Study (SCWDS) screens clinical cases submitted for AI.
5. All inquires to state agencies (i.e. GDA, Georgia Department of Human Resources, Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Georgia Emergency Management Agency, etc.) or other entities about dead birds will be advised in accordance with the State of Georgia Dead Bird Protocol.

B. Active Surveillance for AI in Georgia

1. Georgia Poultry Laboratory Network (GPLN)

   a. The National Chicken Council (NCC) has AI monitoring programs for commercial poultry. Georgia broiler companies participate in the NCC program, testing all breeder and broiler flocks before processing. The National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) and its corresponding program calls for testing breeder broiler, layer, upland game birds, exhibition poultry, and game fowl flocks throughout their productive life.

   b. All primary breeder and multiplier commercial poultry flocks in Georgia participate in the NPIP AI Clean Program.

   c. Auctions, Sales, and Fairs

      • The goal is to visit half of the approximate forty (40) assemblages per month and to test a representative sample of birds from each consignment. Sampling is conducted by GPLN and Georgia Department of Agriculture representatives.

      • All birds sampled at auctions, sales and fairs/shows are tested at the GPLN for AI using the AGID test.

   d. Testing for interstate or international movement of poultry

      • Commercial poultry testing for interstate or international travel overlaps with the NCC and NPIP surveillance programs.

      • Other avian species are tested for AI by using the ELISA, AGID, RRT-PCR or other antigen detection tests, as determined by the destination’s (Nation or State) entrance requirements.

2. Southeastern Cooperative Wildlife Disease Study (SCWDS). SCWDS randomly samples relevant migratory species for influenza viruses. Georgia is not a major migratory waterfowl wintering area.

3. USDA Wildlife Services, in partnership with the Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Wildlife Resources Division will be collecting samples from selected species of waterfowl and shorebirds during the fall and winter of 2006. Samples will be tested for the presence of Avian Influenza as outlined in the document entitled "An Early Detection System for Asian H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Wild Migratory Birds, U.S. Interagency Strategic Plan."
V. DEFINITIONS OF SUSPECT FLOCK AND CONFIRMED POSITIVE DIAGNOSIS OF HPAI

A. Definition of a Suspect Flock

1. Laboratory Detection of AI antibody and/or virus

A positive agar gel immunodiffusion (AGID) test or an antigen detection test on the initial laboratory submission is always repeated at the screening laboratory prior to being classified as a suspect. If the retest is also positive, it will be classified as “presumptive positive” and the samples will be promptly forwarded to the NVSL for confirmation. Simultaneously, the flock is visited and extensively sampled following the protocol outlined in the Georgia LPAI Plan.

“Presumptive positive” test results at the screening laboratory are confirmed at NVSL by conducting a hemagglutination inhibition (HI) test (to determine the hemagglutinin subtype <H>) and repeating the AGID test, if HI results are negative. A positive AGID or HI test confirms the serological diagnosis of AI and virus detection will then be attempted on the flock. A negative HI test on an AGID positive sample is considered inconclusive and additional samples will be collected for additional antibody and virus detection attempts.

Note: A positive RRT-PCR result by NVSL confirms the presence of AI but does not identify virus pathogenicity. A virus isolate is required for identification of HPAI, (see section V. B. below)

2. Clinical Suspicion of HPAI

Susceptible species with clinical signs, unexplained high mortality and/or pathological lesions consistent with HPAI will be classified as “suspects”.

B. Definition of a Confirmed Positive Diagnosis of HPAI by the National Veterinary Services Laboratory

The term “Confirmed Positive Diagnosis” relates only to poultry as defined in this Plan and does not include a positive laboratory result in other susceptible species.

The index case (first confirmed positive diagnosis) of a HPAI virus must be identified by the NVSL and must meet one of the following criteria as defined in 9CFR part 53.1 to satisfy the case definition:

1. Any influenza virus that kills at least 75% of eight 4 to 6 week old susceptible chickens within 10 days following intravenous inoculation with .2 ml of a 1:10 dilution of a bacteria-free infectious allantoic fluid; or
2. Any H5 or H7 virus that does not meet the criteria above but has an amino acid sequence at the hemagglutinin cleavage site that is compatible with highly pathogenic influenza viruses; or (sequencing takes 1-2 days)

3. Any influenza virus that is not an H5 or H7 subtype and that kills one to five chickens, and grows in cell culture in the absence of trypsin.

VI. INITIAL SUSPECT FLOCK

A suspect flock will trigger the activation of the Georgia H5 and H7 Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza (LPAI) First Response and Containment Plan pending further laboratory testing. Realizing that the process of confirmation by the NVSL may take up to 10 days, the goal is to begin disease control utilizing the LPAI plan prior to receiving official HPAI confirmation.

A. Reporting Requirements

In accordance with Georgia O.C.G.A. 4-4-6, any person who makes a clinical diagnosis or laboratory confirmation of or who reasonably suspects the presence or occurrence of avian influenza must report this event to the Georgia State Veterinarian at 404-656-3667 or the USDA Area Veterinarian in Charge at 770-922-7860.

In addition, USDA APHIS Veterinary Services has established Reporting and Submission Requirements for All Presumptive Positive Avian Influenza H5 samples.

B. Company/Owner Voluntary Isolation

1. All suspect flocks should be immediately and voluntarily isolated by the company/owner and grower/manager pending laboratory confirmation. A state-issued quarantine may be placed on the premises if deemed necessary by the State Veterinarian or the USDA AVIC.

2. Voluntary isolation of suspect flocks implies that:

   a. All servicing to the farm should cease immediately, with the exception of critical deliveries (e.g. feed). Deliveries should preferably be the last stop of the week (e.g. Friday afternoon). Contact surfaces of all delivery trucks must be cleaned and disinfected prior to leaving the premises.

   b. No visitors should be allowed, with the exception of designated diagnosticians, GDA and USDA approved personnel, limited company personnel, and other limited and authorized personnel using appropriate biosecurity measures.

C. Sampling of the Suspect Flock

1. Additional sampling may be necessary to define the AI status of the flock. If additional samples are necessary, a poultry diagnostician may be dispatched by the
GPLN or a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) may be dispatched by the State Veterinarian or the USDA AVIC.

2. The diagnostician may be accompanied by GDA or USDA approved personnel.

3. Biosecurity procedures that should be followed on the premises will be explained to the company/owner and grower/manager during that visit.

4. The diagnostician may review specific literature and information with the company/owner and grower/manager.

D. Epidemiology

Suspect flocks will be investigated in accordance with the VS Memoranda 580.4, “Procedures for Investigating a Suspected Foreign Animal Disease/Emerging Disease Incident (FAD/EDI)”. Additional details on investigating a suspected FAD/EDI are included in Annex 10: Procedures for Investigating a Foreign Animal/Emerging Disease and an H5 Detection Event.

Prior to confirmation of a positive HPAI result by NVSL, a preliminary epidemiological investigation may be initiated by the GPLN, the State Veterinarian, or the AVIC, including preliminary Geographic Information System (GIS) activation and analysis of the area/zone situation. The investigation is to be conducted by a poultry diagnostician deployed by the GPLN, or a Poultry Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (Poultry FADD) deployed by the State Veterinarian or AVIC. See Section XI A 1 regarding Epidemiological Investigations.

E. Notification by the State Veterinarian or the USDA AVIC

The State Veterinarian or the USDA AVIC should assure that the following are notified:

- Company/owner and manager of birds
- Georgia Agriculture Commissioner
- PEDC by conference call
  - The Georgia Poultry Federation will inform representatives of the commercial poultry industry, as appropriate.
- Other appropriate response agencies (e.g. OHS/GEMA, GA Division of Public Health, Athens and Tifton Diagnostic Laboratories, etc.), as necessary

VII. NEGATIVE TEST RESULT OF SUSPECT FLOCK

NVSL will inform the corresponding parties according to USDA APHIS VS policy. The screening laboratory and/or the diagnostician in turn will immediately notify the company/owner, the grower/manager. GDA and USDA will consider releasing the premises from quarantine, if an official quarantine has been issued. The company/owner may release voluntary isolation procedures and resume normal business.

The State Veterinarian or the USDA AVIC should assure that the following are notified:
The Georgia Poultry Federation will inform representatives of the commercial poultry industry.

**VIII. PRESUMPTIVE POSITIVE OF HPAI**

Many additional actions will be taken upon receipt of a presumptive positive laboratory result from NVSL.

**A. Initial Response (first few hours)**

1. **Notification by National Veterinary Services Laboratory**
   NVSL shall immediately report all presumptive positive HPAI test results (i.e. RRT-PCR) to APHIS Administrator, VS Deputy Administrator, Associate Deputy Administrator for Emergency Management & Diagnostics, Associate Deputy Administrator for Regional and Field Operations, Associate Deputy Administrator for National Animal Health Policy and Programs, APHIS Chief of Staff, and Special Assistant to the Deputy Administrator, VS. The Associate Deputy Administrator for Regional and Field Operations will contact the Regional Director, who will notify the appropriate AVIC. The AVIC will notify the State Veterinarian and the State laboratory.

2. **GPLN**
   Upon notification of a presumptive positive result, the GPLN will update its evaluation of the area/zone situation utilizing GIS and prepare a report for the PEDC.

3. **State Veterinarian/Georgia Department of Agriculture**
   Realizing that the Georgia Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza (LPAI) Plan will likely have been initiated with the finding of a suspect flock, the following activations shall take place, if not already completed:
   
   a. Deploy a VMO/FADD to the premises to issue a quarantine (if not already under official quarantine) and to continue epidemiological investigation;

   b. Assure immediate notification of owner/manager of the premises, if a commercial poultry company;

   c. Immediately notify the Commissioner of Agriculture;

   d. Activate the PEDC by conference call;
e. Consider activating ESF 11, and this Plan, if there is a high degree of confidence that HPAI may be present;

f. Consider activating the Unified Area Command (UAC) and the Multi-Agency Coordinating (MAC) group with the USDA AVIC;

g. UAC will consider activating appropriate State Agricultural Response Teams (SART) by issuing joint delegation of authority to the Incident Commander(s);

h. Activate Communications Plan.

4. USDA AVIC
   a. Maintain close communication with the State Veterinarian and offer assistance;
   b. Participate in the Unified Area Command and other response groups, if activated;
   c. Comply with Veterinary Services Memorandum on Reporting and Submission Requirements for All Presumptive Positive Avian Influenza H5 samples;
   d. Request USDA resources as needed.

B. Secondary Response (first few days)

1. State Veterinarian/Georgia Department of Agriculture
   a. Consult with OHS/GEMA regarding possible activation of the State Operations Center (SOC);
   b. Consult with the Commissioner of Agriculture regarding a possible request, if warranted, to the Governor to deploy additional state assets and/or declare a state of emergency; The Governor’s Executive Order for HPAI Emergency Declaration Draft has been approved by legal counsel in the Governor’s office and is included as an annex in this Plan;
   c. Consider activation of Unified Area Command (UAC) and a Multi-Agency Coordinating (MAC) group with the USDA AVIC;
   d. UAC will consider activating appropriate State Agricultural Response Teams (SART) by issuing joint delegation of authority to the Incident Commander.
   e. Consider establishing Control Area and issue official quarantine

2. Incident Command (SART), if appropriate
   a. Initiate the SART Response;
   b. Take immediate and appropriate steps to facilitate the depopulation of the Presumptive Positive Premises, including procedures for indemnity;
c. Issue additional quarantines and establish movement restrictions within the Control/Quarantine Area;

d. Continue epidemiological investigation and consider quarantines of epidemiological links;

e. Establish appropriate surveillance within the Control/Quarantine Area and the Buffer Zone.

3. USDA AVIC
   a. Maintain close communication with the State Veterinarian and offer assistance;
   
   b. Participate in the appropriate response groups (e.g. UAC, MAC, PEDC, etc.) as necessary;
   
   c. Keep USDA VS Eastern Region apprised of current status.

4. Georgia Division of Public Health
   a. Provide support to the UAC;
   
   b. Partner with the JIC and provide communications regarding potential human health issues;
   
   c. Provide science-based human health risk assessment for infection control and human disease surveillance based upon available information;
   
   d. Support the activities of the GA-SART;
   
   e. Coordinate communications between UAC and Health Districts:
   
   f. Consider need to activate GDPH EOC

   a. Support the Georgia Department of Agriculture’s activities with ESF 11, if activated;
   
   b. Consider initiating the Joint Information Center;
   
   c. Serve as state coordinating agency to facilitate the activation of the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan, if necessary;
   
   d. Possible activation of the SOC that will serve as a Multi-Agency Command Center;
e. Support local Emergency Management Agencies in their efforts at the site of the event;

f. Provide information to the Office of the Governor, as necessary.

6. Georgia Forestry Commission
   a. Mobilize Incident Management Teams to assist SART and AC, upon request.

7. Commercial Poultry Industry
   a. Activate individual company response plans;

   b. Partner with the JIC, if activated, and communicate with their constituencies; The Georgia Poultry Federation will serve as the point of contact for the commercial poultry industry.

   c. Support the response efforts, including participation in the SART, UAC and MAC as appropriate;

   d. Coordinate industry efforts with state, national and international industry groups;

   e. Collaborate with the Georgia Division of Public Health, as appropriate.

8. Other Avian Related Entities
   a. Establish contact with UAC and SART Liaison Officers;

   b. Disseminate information and protocol recommendations among their industry groups;

   c. Collaborate with the SART, UAC, and MAC as appropriate;

   d. Collaborate with the Georgia Division of Public Health as appropriate.

IX. CONFIRMED POSITIVE OF HPAI

A. Initial Response (first few hours)

1. Notification by National Veterinary Services Laboratory
   All NVSL confirmed positive HPAI test results (i.e. virus isolation) shall be reported to the APHIS Administrator, VS Deputy Administrator, and other listed Administrators. The Associate Deputy Administrator for Regional and Field Operations will contact the Regional Directors. They, in turn will contact the appropriate AVIC, who will then contact the State Veterinarian. Conference calls may be organized by APHIS VS to include AVIC’s, State Veterinarians, and additional calls to include Industry Stakeholders. Classifying a case as a “presumptive positive case” or “confirmed positive case” is the responsibility of the VS Deputy Administrator.
2. **GPLN**
   Upon notification of a confirmed positive result, the GPLN will update its evaluation of the area/zone situation utilizing GIS and prepare a report for the PEDC.

3. **State Veterinarian/Georgia Department of Agriculture**
   The following actions shall take place, if not already completed;
   
   a. Assure immediate notification of owner/manager of the premises;
   
   b. Immediately notify the Commissioner of Agriculture;
   
   c. Inform the PEDC by conference call;
   
   d. Consider requesting that the Commissioner of Agriculture issue emergency rules for disease containment and associated with movement restrictions; notify stakeholders of these movement restrictions, if implemented;
   
   e. Activate ESF 11 as appropriate for the level of response and fully activate this Plan;
   
   f. Modify Communications Plan to reflect confirmation of HPAI.

4. **USDA AVIC**
   a. Receive Delegation of Authority from Agency Administrator as Area Co-Commander;
   
   b. Maintain close communication with the State Veterinarian and offer assistance;
   
   c. Participate in the appropriate response groups (e.g. UAC, MAC, PEDC, etc.) as necessary;
   
   d. Keep USDA VS Eastern Region and Agency Administrator apprised of current status.
   
   e. Participate in conference calls coordinated by USDA Emergency Management and Diagnostics Staff with appropriate management and laboratory officials for action planning.

**B. Secondary Response (first few days)**

1. **State Veterinarian/Georgia Department of Agriculture**
   a. Consult with OHS/GEMA regarding possible activation of the State Operations Center (SOC);
b. Consult with the Commissioner of Agriculture regarding a possible request, if warranted, to the Governor to deploy additional state assets and/or declare a state of emergency and/or to request the President for an emergency declaration or declaration of an incident of national significance.

c. Activate the Unified Area Command (UAC) and the Multi-Agency Coordinating (MAC) group with the USDA AVIC, if not already activated;

d. UAC will activate appropriate State Agricultural Response Teams (SART) by issuing joint delegation of authority to the Incident Commander(s), if not already issued;

e. Communicate and coordinate with animal industry leaders and other State Veterinarians.

2. Incident Command (SART)
   a. Initiate the SART Response, if not already initiated;

   b. Take immediate and appropriate steps to facilitate the depopulation of the Positive Premises, including procedures for indemnity;

   c. Issue additional quarantines as necessary and establish/revise movement restrictions for the Control/Quarantine Area;

   d. Continue epidemiological investigation and quarantine epidemiological links;

   e. Establish appropriate surveillance within the Control/Quarantine Area and the Buffer Zone.

3. USDA AVIC
   a. Initiate Cooperative Agreement between USDA and the Georgia Department of Agriculture to institutionalize agency cooperation in the control and eradication of HPAI;

   b. UAC will activate appropriate State Agricultural Response Teams (SART) by issuing joint delegation of authority to the Incident Commander(s), if not already issued;

   c. Immediately request appropriate resources from the National Veterinary Stockpile;

   d. Request additional support from USDA and other federal agencies, if National Response Plan is not already activated;

   e. Continue to maintain close communication with the State Veterinarian and offer assistance;
f. Continue to participate in the appropriate response groups (e.g. UAC, MAC, PEDC, etc.) as necessary;

g. Continue to keep USDA VS Eastern Region apprised of current status.

4. Georgia Division of Public Health
   a. Provide support to the UAC and MAC;

   b. Partner with the JIC and provide communications regarding human health;

   c. Activate necessary components of GDPH EOC;

      i. Coordinate delivery of resources to protect worker safety;

      ii. Conduct disease surveillance among exposed persons and their contacts;

   iii. Support the activities of the GA-SART;

   iv. Monitor human vaccine efficacy and any reports of adverse reactions among personnel receiving vaccine;

   v. Provide support to affected health district;

   vi. Coordinate resources among health districts;

   vii. Coordinate communications between UAC and Health Districts.

   a. Support the Georgia Department of Agriculture’s activities with ESF 11;

   b. Maintain the Joint Information Center;

   c. Serve as state coordinating agency to facilitate the activation of the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan;

   d. Possible activation of the SOC that will serve as a Multi-Agency Command Center;

   e. Support local Emergency Management Agencies in their efforts at the site of the outbreak. Local resources may be requested from the following:

      1) Emergency Medical Services

      2) Fire Services
3) Public and Environmental Health

4) Public Safety

5) Public Works

f. Provide information to the Office of the Governor, as necessary.

g. Assist with the enactment of a Governor’s Declaration of state of emergency;

6. Georgia Forestry Commission
   b. Mobilize Incident Management Teams to assist SART and AC, if not already requested and mobilized.

7. Poultry Industry
   a. Activate individual company response plans, if not already activated;

   b. Partner with the JIC and communicate with their constituencies;

   c. Support the response efforts, including participation in the SART, UAC and MAC as appropriate;

   d. Coordinate industry efforts with state, national and international industry groups;

   e. Collaborate with the Georgia Division of Public Health, as appropriate.

8. Other Related Entities
   a. Establish contact with UAC and SART Liaison Officers;

   b. Disseminate information and protocol recommendations among their industry groups;

   c. Collaborate with the SART, UAC, and MAC as appropriate;

   d. Collaborate with the Georgia Division of Public Health as appropriate.

C. Tertiary Response (throughout remainder of outbreak)

1. State Veterinarian/Georgia Department of Agriculture
   a. Consult with OHS/GEMA regarding possible activation of the State Operations Center (SOC);

   b. Consult with the Commissioner of Agriculture regarding a possible request, if warranted, to the Governor to deploy additional state assets and/or declare a state of emergency and/or request the President for an emergency declaration or declaration of an incident of national significance;
c. Serve as Joint Commander of Unified Area Command (UAC) with the USDA AVIC, participate in the MAC group, and support the SART(s);

d. Mobilize additional SARTs as necessary.

2. Incident Command (SART)
   a. Maintain the SART Response;

   b. Continue disease eradication efforts, including procedures for indemnity.

3. USDA AVIC
   a. Serve as Joint Commander of the Unified Area Command, participate in the MAC group and other response groups, and support the SART(s);

   b. Assure communication among the GA Commissioner of Agriculture, the GA State Veterinarian, the GA Governor and the USDA Secretary regarding a request for a USDA Extra-ordinary Emergency Declaration. Communicate with USDA in the event GA Governor requests a Presidential Declaration as an Incident of National Significance. Request additional support from USDA and other federal agencies according to the category of declaration;

   c. Keep USDA VS Eastern Region apprised of current status.

4. Georgia Division of Public Health
   a. Provide support to the UAC and MAC;

   b. Partner with the JIC and provide communications regarding human health;

   c. Continue EOC activities

      i. Coordinate delivery of resources to protect worker safety;

      ii. Conduct disease surveillance among exposed persons.

   iii. Identify additional at-risk human populations and expand surveillance to these communities;

   iv. Continue to monitor human vaccine efficacy and any report of adverse reactions among personnel receiving vaccine;

   v. Support the activities of the GA-SART;

   vi. Provide support to affected health district;

   vii. Coordinate resources among health districts;
viii. Coordinate communications between UAC and Health Districts;

ix. Coordinate communications among health departments regionally or across states.

   a. Support the Georgia Department of Agriculture’s activities with ESF 11;

   b. Coordinate the Joint Information Center;

   c. Activate the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan
      1) Coordination of volunteers and donated goods, and private sector activities;

      2) Prioritization of State resources in support of the incident;

      3) Provide formal tasking for State Departments and Agencies to provide for support of the incident;

      4) Coordinate and support GFC Level 2 Incident Management Team for resources and emergency contracts;

      5) Coordinate integration of Federal assets;

      6) Provide for and coordinate recovery activities;

      7) Provide timely and accurate information to the Office of the Governor to facilitate Executive oversight of all state operations;

      8) Facilitate standing down the State Operations.

   d. Support local Emergency Management Agencies in their efforts at the site of the outbreak. Local resources may be requested from the following:
      1) Emergency Medical Services

      2) Fire Services

      3) Public and Environmental Health

      4) Public Safety

      5) Public Works

   e. Provide information to the Office of the Governor, as necessary;
f. Assist with the enactment of a Governor’s Declaration of state of emergency, if not already declared;

g. Evaluate the need for the Governor to request that the President declare this event as an incident of national significance and issue a Presidential Declaration of Emergency.

6. Commercial Poultry Industry
   a. Continue activation of individual company response plans;

   b. Partner with the JIC and communicate with their constituencies;

   c. Support the response efforts, including participation in the SART, UAC and MAC as appropriate;

   d. Coordinate industry efforts with state, national and international industry groups;

   e. Collaborate with the Georgia Division of Public Health, as appropriate.

7. USDA-APHIS-VS (Headquarters)
   a. Keep USDA AVIC apprised of current national status;

   b. Request that the Secretary of Agriculture issue a Declaration of Emergency and/or an Extra-ordinary Emergency, if appropriate, and notify appropriate federal agencies of the emergency declaration;

   c. Coordinate the response activities of all USDA and other federal agencies to support USDA-APHIS-VS activities;

   d. Determine necessary measures to minimize the consequences of the outbreak to the nation and communicate these decisions nationally and internationally;

   e. Coordinate national surveillance activities;

   f. Determine if federal quarantine for interstate and intrastate commerce should be issued;

   g. In consultation with the GA Governor and GA Commissioner, assist in determining if it is necessary to request support beyond that available through USDA.

   h. Serve as the lead federal agency for ESF-11 and work with FEMA to coordinate the support of federal agencies through full or partial activation of the National Response Plan;

   i. Consolidate and present the official situation reports to the Secretary;
j. Reimburse for all indemnities paid for animals and animal products and related operational costs as appropriate;

k. Pay indemnity for animals and animal products, and related costs (e.g. destruction of related materials, disposal, C&D);

l. Provide surge laboratory capacity and support of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network;

m. Deploy National Veterinary Stockpile and IMTs, as requested;

n. Review possible AI vaccination requests.

8. USDA-APHIS-VS Deputy Administrator through the APHIS Emergency National Incident Management System
   a. Provide international and national communication on the status of the situation;

   b. Involve federal, state and industry partners in the decision-making process with respect to the consequences of the disease on the U.S.

9. USDA Secretary
   a. Declare an Emergency or Extra-Ordinary Emergency, if necessary, to allocate appropriate funds for response activities, including indemnity;

   b. Mobilize additional USDA resources to assist the state;

   c. Request assistance from other federal agencies.

X. ZONES AND PREMISES

A. Zones Designations

The designation of one or more Control Areas and various Zones is essential to successful quarantine, movement control, and animal disease eradication activities. The specific radius and geometrical shape of the Control Areas and Zones will be determined by the IC using the following as guidelines:

- **Infected Zone**: an initial area of an approximately 2 miles (3 km) in radius beyond the perimeter of an Infected Premises. This area should encompass all presumptive positive and confirmed positive premises, and should include as many of the contact premises as logistically or scientifically feasible. Certain premises in this zone will be subject to depopulation and cleaning and disinfection activities.

- **Buffer Surveillance Zone**: area immediately surrounding the infected zone. This zone may initially be quite large until the scope of the outbreak is determined. The
area will be subject to intensive AI surveillance activities on all premises with poultry.

- **Vaccination Zone:** the immediate area within the Buffer Surveillance Zone surrounding the Infected Zone where vaccination may be used if determined necessary.

- **Control Area:** area consisting of the combined Infected and Buffer Surveillance Zones. This area will be subject to official quarantines and movement restrictions.

- **Surveillance Zone:** a zone within the Free Area that surrounds the Control Area. This zone should be a minimum of 6.2 miles (10km) in radius. The zone will be subject to AI surveillance on premises determined to be at high risk of infection.

- **Free Area:** all areas, including the Surveillance Zone, outside of the Control Area and determined to be free of HPAI.

**B. Premises Designations**

Incident Command may designate premises as Infected, Contact, Suspect, At-Risk, or Free using the following as guidelines:

- **Infected Premises:** a premises on which HPAI is presumed or confirmed to exist or meet the current case definition.

- **Contact Premises:** a premises with an epidemiological link (direct or indirect contact) to an infected premises. Contact Premises that are outside a Control Area will be considered an additional Infected Zone and must be surrounded by a Buffer Surveillance Zone, at a minimum.

- **Suspect Premises:** a premises (1) under investigation for a report of compatible clinical signs, but with no apparent epidemiological link (i.e. Contact Premises), or (2) within the Infected Zone and not yet determined to be an Infected Premises or Contact Premises.

- **At-Risk Premises:** a premises within the Buffer Surveillance Zone that have birds or other susceptible animals, but none of which have a compatible clinical illness.

- **Free Premises:** a premises within the Free Area, other than a Suspect Premises.

**XI. RESPONSE FOR DESIGNATED PREMISES**

**A. Response for Infected Premises**

These premises will be subject to quarantine and depopulation of all birds and other susceptible animals.
1. Epidemiological Investigation

Following confirmation of HPAI, an epidemiological investigation shall be completed on the infected premises. The investigation is to be conducted by a poultry diagnostician dispatched by the GPLN or a Poultry Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (Poultry FADD) dispatched by the State Veterinarian or AVIC. The diagnostician shall report to the Incident Command.

2. Appraisals and Compensation

   a. Appraisal

      As stated in the U.S. Constitution, the federal government shall compensate an owner for any asset it takes or destroys. The USDA has the authority and will compensate owners for the fair market value of depopulated poultry or destroyed property in order to control an outbreak of HPAI. USDA compensation is not designed to cover the entire loss of the poultry owner.

      Incident Command will utilize the USDA established procedures for conducting appraisal or valuation of the affected poultry and property. The immediate purpose of the appraisal process is to determine the fair market value of affected poultry and exposed materials to enable prompt depopulation.

   b. USDA Compensation

      In accordance with 9 CFR Part 53, USDA is authorized to pay up to 100 percent of the expenses of purchase, destruction and disposition of birds and materials required to be destroyed because of being contaminated by or exposed to HPAI. The destruction, disinfection and disposal of animals or materials must be in compliance with USDA requirements in order to be eligible for federal compensation.

3. Euthanasia and Mass Depopulation

Euthanasia shall be conducted under the direction of Incident Command in accordance with the AVMA Report of the Panel on Euthanasia, 2000 edition. All poultry on the infected premises should be euthanized as promptly as determined to be appropriate.

Considerations should include, but are not limited to, the following factors:

- Pathogenicity of virus
- Availability of resources for euthanasia
- Availability of disposal options
- Potential for spread to susceptible flocks
- Worker protection
- Animal Welfare
Expediency and efficiency of available methods

The preferred methods of euthanasia and/or mass depopulation are the use of an inhalant gas such as CO\(_2\) (carbon dioxide), fire foam, cervical dislocation, and lethal injection. The latter two methods may be used in individual birds under veterinary supervision. In emergency situations the use of CO\(_2\) and foaming technology may be used as methods of mass depopulation in certain circumstances. The selection of the most appropriate methods in any given situation depends upon the species of animals involved, available means of animal restraint, skill of personnel, number of animals, geographic setting, housing type, and other factors.

4. Disposal

Proper disposal of diseased poultry products and contaminated substances is necessary to prevent the spread of disease while safeguarding public health.

For disposal of carcasses and related materials, the Georgia Dead Animal Disposal Act O.C.G.A. 4-4-5 and the Georgia Department of Agriculture Rules for Dead Animal Disposal 40-13-5 shall be followed. Carcass disposal methods for any particular premises will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

Approved methods of carcass disposal include burial on the premises, burial in landfill, incineration, composting, rendering, and other experimental methods approved by the Commissioner of Agriculture. Carcass disposal procedures will be under the direction of Incident Command.

Factors that will be considered in carcass disposal options may include, but are not limited to:

- Biosecurity
- Environmental impact
- Available resources
- Costs
- Emergency authority

Disposal of solid waste other than carcasses and related materials will be in accordance with the Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection Division requirements.

5. Cleaning and Disinfection

The affected premises shall be cleaned and disinfected (C&D) following depopulation. The C&D plan and procedures will be approved and monitored by the Incident Command.

6. Security and Biosecurity

   a. Security
   The premises will be secured during euthanasia, disposal, and cleaning/disinfection. This will be directed by Incident Command.

   b. Biosecurity
The premises biosecurity will be directed by Incident Command. Of particular importance will be proper protective clothing and procedures for premises entry/exit of personnel, equipment, vehicles, etc. to maintain biosecurity.

7. **Wildlife Issues**
All infected premises will be evaluated and a response will be formulated on a case-by-case basis depending on the potential for wildlife contact and/or involvement. This potential will be determined based on the relative number and species of wild birds on the site and existing opportunities for direct contact (i.e. birds have direct contact with infected domestic fowl) or indirect contact (i.e. birds have close contact across wire or can be indirectly exposed by runoff or infected material such as carcasses or litter previously removed from the poultry premises).

Response plans will be continually modified as existing field and experimental data on HPAI in wild birds becomes available. All actions involving wildlife will be in accordance with protocols outlined in this document, relative state statutes (O.C.G.A. 27-1-22 and 27-5-3), and in cooperation with appropriate state and federal wildlife agencies.

B. **Response for Contact, Suspect and At-Risk Premises**
Contact, suspect, and at-risk premises will be evaluated and an individual plan developed to minimize the spread of disease. These premises may be subject to quarantine and disease control measures, including depopulation.

XII. **ISSUANCE AND RELEASE OF QUARANTINES**

A. **Issuance of Quarantines**
GDA quarantines will be issued for individual premises, counties, and/or larger geographical areas as needed to restrict movement of potentially infected animals or contaminated items. Quarantines may be issued by designated state or federal agriculture personnel.

USDA may issue quarantines as deemed appropriate under emergency authorities.

B. **Release of Quarantines**
State issued quarantines will remain in effect until an official quarantine release has been issued by the GDA. Individual quarantines may be released while area-wide quarantines remain in effect and vice-versa.

XIII. **LABORATORY SURVEILLANCE AND DIAGNOSTICS**

A. Samples from Control Areas will be intentionally diverted to non-traditional poultry laboratories as an additional measure to maintain biosecurity. The Athens Veterinary Diagnostic and the Tifton Veterinary Diagnostic and Investigational Laboratories with the University of Georgia College Of Veterinary Medicine will be used for surveillance and diagnostic testing of samples from the Zones within Control Areas. The Athens and Tifton laboratories are biosafety level three (BSL3) facilities and are approved by the USDA APHIS
VS National Animal Health Laboratory Network to conduct foreign animal disease testing in the event of an outbreak.

B. The Georgia Poultry Laboratory Network (GPLN) operated by the Official State Agency of the National Poultry Improvement Plan will be used for surveillance and diagnostic testing of samples from outside Control Areas. These laboratories are also included as a component of the USDA APHIS VS National Animal Health Laboratory Network. The GPLN is the primary surveillance and diagnostic laboratory for poultry diseases and will continue to serve in this role in the event of an HPAI outbreak.

C. All laboratories shall report their findings to the appropriate response personnel as required by the specific procedures established for the incident.

XIV. VACCINATION

Implementing a HPAI vaccination program as a component of the eradication effort is a complex undertaking involving a myriad of considerations, including trade issues, by key decision-makers. Factors involved in the decision would include, but not be limited to, the availability of sufficient quantities of an effective vaccine, sufficient personnel and resources to store and administer the vaccine, personal safety, and the impact on trade. A request would be initiated by the State Veterinarian and the USDA AVIC, in consultation with the PEDC, and forwarded to the USDA APHIS Administrator for approval.

Current USDA policy as described in VS memorandum 565.12, allows “H5 and H7 vaccine to be used as a tool for combating any potential outbreak of HPAI in the United States.” Avian influenza vaccine may be prepared from any serotype, including H5 and H7, and may be recommended for use in chickens or turkeys subject to the requirements and restrictions specified in USDA Veterinary Biologics Memorandum 800.85.

Vaccinated Premises within a Vaccination Zone(s) will be established if vaccine is utilized.

XV. SAFETY AND PERSONAL PROTECTION

Safety is to remain a top priority throughout the response. To protect the health and safety of responders and other personnel exposed to HPAI, Incident Command is responsible for assuring that all activities are conducted in a safe manner and that all responders are properly trained and equipped with appropriate personal protective equipment.

Because some HPAI viruses have exhibited zoonotic potential, a Georgia HPAI Respiratory Protection Program has been established which meets the standards of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the USDA.
In addition, a HPAI Worker Safety Program has also been established to address safety issues beyond respiratory protection, such as protection from the elements, fatigue, physical injury, etc.

Incident Command is responsible for assuring that response procedures remain in compliance with both Programs.

**XVI. OTHER SUSCEPTIBLE SPECIES**

In the event that HPAI is detected in other susceptible animals, appropriate response measures will be taken according to the best available scientific information. The UAC and the Incident Command may work with corresponding technical experts to establish proper guidelines and operating procedures.

In the event that HPAI is detected in free-living wild birds as a result of either live-bird or dead-bird surveillance, the site from which the bird was detected will be immediately investigated. Potential actions will be developed based on this investigation and will follow the response plan outlined under Section XI. A. 7. Wildlife Issues.

**XVII. FBI AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

The FBI considers a foreign animal disease outbreak to be caused by an act of agroterrorism until proven otherwise. The FBI will be engaged in the response through the Joint Operations Center and will maintain communication with the UAC, as appropriate, as they conduct their criminal investigation. The UAC and the Incident Command will cooperate fully with the FBI and other law enforcement personnel in conducting the investigation, including securing and providing forensic evidence.

**XVIII. STAKEHOLDER COMMUNICATION**

Effective communication in the event of a HPAI outbreak is paramount to enhance response activities and to apprise stakeholders. It is imperative that timely, accurate, and audience-specific messages are developed and delivered effectively. Target audiences could include responders, commercial poultry industry, backyard bird owners, media, the general public, etc.

Prior to the formation of the response structure (i.e. UAC, Incident Command, JIC, etc), information will be coordinated by the State Veterinarian and the USDA AVIC in consultation with the PEDC. Release of information will be approved by the State Veterinarian, the USDA AVIC and their superiors.

Representatives (i.e. Public Information Officers) from the federal, state, and local agencies involved in response, as well as representatives from poultry organizations and the poultry industry will be engaged in the response through the Joint Information Center (JIC) coordinated by the OHS-GEMA. The mission of the JIC is to coordinate information from involved
agencies, organizations and the private sector in order to develop informational materials for distribution. Following approval by the UAC, the information can then be released by the JIC for distribution through various outlets.

XIX. RECOVERY
A goal of this Plan is to return those affected to a normal state of operations as quickly as possible. Negative impacts on poultry premises may be minimized through animal disease preparedness activities, including continuity of operations planning.

XX. REVISING HPAI RESPONSE PLAN

The State Veterinarian will request review of the plan periodically from stakeholders, to include but not limited to, representatives of the poultry industry, the PEDC, GDA officials, USDA officials, Diagnostic Laboratory personnel, Public Health officials, and OHS/GEMA officials, and offer suggestions to improve the Plan.

XXI. RESOURCES

A. Publications

- Summary of the National Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Plan (USDA APHIS VS – August 2006)
- Veterinary Services Memorandum No. 580.4, Procedures for Investigating a Suspected Foreign Animal Disease/Emerging Disease Incident (FAD/EDI).
- Veterinary Services Memorandum No. 565.14, Reporting Confirmed Findings of Low Pathogenic Notifiable Avian Influenza (LPNAI)(H5 and H7 Subtypes) to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and to Trading Partners.
- Letter of June 2, 2006 from John Clifford, Deputy Administrator, VS concerning: Reporting and Submission Requirements for All Presumptive Positive Avian Influenza (AI) H5 samples.
- 2000 EPDTF Manual – Delaware
- Australian Disease Strategy Plan for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
- Georgia LPAI(H5,H7) First Response and Containment Plan
- Manual of SOPs for the Texas HPAI Task Force
- OIE Manual of Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines
- Options for Dead Bird Disposal – University of Florida
- Oregon Surveillance and Response for Avian Influenza – Outline for Actions by Oregon Department of Agriculture and Oregon Poultry Producers
- Procedures to be followed for management of an Outbreak of Emergency Poultry Disease (EPD) in the Tri-State Area
- Georgia Office of Homeland Security/ GEMA, the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan

B. Websites
XXII. GLOSSARY


Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC): The veterinary official of USDA-APHIS-VS assigned by the Administrator to supervise and manage the official animal health programs of USDA-APHIS-VS in the state or concerned states.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At-risk premises:</td>
<td>A premises within the Buffer Surveillance Zone that has birds or other susceptible animals but none of which have a compatible clinical illness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biosecurity:</td>
<td>Farm management practices designed to protect both food animals and their human consumers from disease-causing agents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffer Surveillance Zone (Buffer Zone):</td>
<td>Area immediately surrounding the infected zone. This zone may initially be quite large until the scope of the outbreak is determined. The area will be subject to intensive AI surveillance activities on all premises with poultry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO):</td>
<td>The Chief Veterinary Officer of the United States is the Deputy Administrator of Veterinary Services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed positive diagnosis of HPAI:</td>
<td>Relates only to poultry as defined in the Plan. The case definition of HPAI is as follows: (1) Any influenza virus that kills at least 75 percent of eight 4 to 6 week old susceptible chickens within 10 days following intravenous inoculation with 0.2 ml of a 1:10 dilution of a bacteria-free, infectious allantoic fluid; (2) Any H5 or H7 virus that does not meet the criteria in item (1) of this definition but has an amino acid sequence at the hemagglutinin cleavage site that is compatible with highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses; or (3) Any influenza virus that is not an H5 or H7 subtype and that kills one to five chickens and grows in cell culture in the absence of trypsin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact premises:</td>
<td>A premises with an epidemiological link (direct or indirect contact) to an infected premises. Contact premises that are outside a Control Area will be considered an additional Infected Zone and must be surrounded by a Buffer Surveillance Zone at a minimum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control/Quarantine Area (Control Area):</td>
<td>Area consisting of the combined Infected and Buffer Surveillance Zones. This area will be subject to official quarantines and movement restrictions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epidemiologically linked:</td>
<td>Includes tracing all contacts with affected animals and premises including movement of birds, humans, fomites, animal products or byproducts, and feedstuffs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF 11:</td>
<td>Under the National Response Plan, resources are grouped</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
into Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) that would most likely be needed during a domestic incident. ESF 11 specifically addresses the protection of agriculture and national resources and is coordinated by the USDA.

Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD): A veterinarian who has taken the foreign animal disease training course at Plum Island and receives continuing education in FADs and animal health emergency management.

Flock: All of the poultry on one farm except that, at the discretion of the Official State Agency, any group of poultry which is segregated from another group and has been so segregated for a period of at least 21 days may be considered as a separate flock.

Free Area: All areas, including the Surveillance Zone, outside of the Control Area and determined to be free of HPAI.

Free Premises: A premises within the Free Area other than a Suspect Premises.

Georgia Poultry Laboratory Network (GPLN): Operated by the Georgia Poultry Improvement Association in conjunction with the USDA and Georgia Department of Agriculture under contract agreement (Tommy Irvin, Commissioner of Agriculture). The Georgia Poultry Improvement Association is the official State agency for the administration of the National Poultry Improvement Plan.

Incident Management Team (IMT): Veterinary Services (VS) has formed six National Incident Management Teams to assist VS and States in responding to animal health emergency events in the United States. These teams are designed to supplement State Animal Health Emergency Response Organizations (State AERO) Incident Management Teams when additional resources, technical expertise or national oversight is required. The teams will operate under the principles and guidelines of the NIMS.

XXIII. ANNEXES
(See Attachments)